A prescription solid-dose manufacturer in Georgia was inspected four times between 2018 and 2025. Each time, FDA cited equipment cleaning deficiencies. Each time, the firm proposed remediation. In January 2026 the warning letter arrived — addressed to the chief executive.
Issue 02 examined a response that cited prior CAPA without explaining why any of it failed. This is the stage after that, and the difference is jurisdictional rather than technical. Once an observation is established as a repeat, FDA stops assessing whether you can fix the deficiency and starts assessing whether your management structure can notice that you didn’t.
Investigators found drug product residue and oxidized metal on multiple pieces of manufacturing equipment — a tablet press among them — all documented as clean and released by the quality unit. Dedicated equipment showed residue, oxidation and foreign material under the same circumstances.
The maintenance findings are more concrete still. Metal detector MFG-1276 was non-functioning during the inspection; the preventive maintenance procedure covering it addressed the detector’s physical appearance rather than whether it worked, and the qualification protocol omitted the unit entirely. A metal screw was found in a sealed bottle of finished product.
The facility findings compound it: gaps in a protective wall with unidentified brown-yellow material inside them, a ceiling vent secured with transparent tape, unfinished and uncleanable walls.
The response was prompt and, on cleaning, practical: a new procedure requiring operators to use a flashlight to detect residues not visible to the naked eye, with training on the revision. The firm also halted packaging until the metal detectors were repaired, and stopped manufacturing until every facility repair was complete.
“You state that you immediately halted all manufacturing operations and promptly took corrective actions to address the specific deficiencies.” FDA’s summary of the firm’s 483 response, Warning Letter 320-26-36
That is not a firm treating the inspection lightly. Every action above is defensible on its own terms. FDA rejected all of them.
The firm repaired every surface investigators pointed at. FDA’s objection is that it “did not provide a systemic and comprehensive CAPA plan to ensure that your facility is and remains in a good state of repair.” Fixing the items answers the list, not the citation — that nothing internal raised them first.
The flashlight procedure improves detection from now on. It says nothing about batches made on equipment released as clean that wasn’t. FDA is direct: the response fails to “assess the impact of your inadequate cleaning processes on drug product that is currently on the market and within expiry.” Same gap on the metal detector — nothing retrospective for batches run while it was down.
“In previous inspections, dated July 18, 2018; February 11, 2022; and February 3, 2023, FDA cited similar CGMP observations, and you proposed specific remediation for these observations in your response. Repeated failures demonstrate that executive management oversight and control over the manufacture of drugs is inadequate.” FDA, Warning Letter 320-26-36
The sentence turns on a clause easy to read past: and you proposed specific remediation for these observations in your response. The prior commitments are not mitigation. They are the proof. A firm that promised three times and was found deficient a fourth has demonstrated something about its management review, not its cleaning.
“Because you failed to correct repeat violations, you should engage a consultant qualified as set forth in 21 CFR 211.34.” FDA closes the escape route in the next breath: a consultant “does not relieve your firm’s obligation to comply,” and executive management “remains responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws.”
A first observation is a question about a process. A repeat is a question about the system supposed to be watching it. The two look identical on the page, and the instinct in each case is to fix what was named, document it, move fast.
On a repeat, speed and specificity work against you. They show a firm that responds well to being told — precisely the capability FDA has stopped believing in. What must be demonstrated instead is detection: that something was looking for this failure mode between inspections and would have found it. If nothing was, the repeat is not a cleaning problem that recurred. It is a management review that never asked.
Note the address block. The letter is directed to the chief executive, and its closing sections — quality systems, consultant recommended, repeat observations — read as a sequence written for that reader.
A defensible response would have led with the 2018, 2022 and 2023 history rather than waiting for FDA to introduce it — what each commitment was, where its verification failed, which batches were made in the intervals. The corrective actions would follow as the consequence of that analysis, not a substitute for it.
The first time, you are answering for a deficiency. After that, you are answering for the system that let it come back.
Veritas Quality Consultants works with pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologics manufacturers on Form 483 responses, root cause analysis, and CAPA development — built to FDA expectations inside the 15-day window.
Request a consultation