A sterile drug manufacturer in Greece was inspected in November 2025. Investigators found microbial plates incubating without the raw data, sample preparation records, or batch identification that give a plate its meaning. The firm went looking on its own, found fourteen more batches in the same condition, and invalidated the sterility tests for all sixteen.
That is a firm doing more than it was asked to do. FDA found the response inadequate anyway. A retrospective review is not a sampling exercise: its size is set by how far the questionable practice reached, not by what a statistician would call a representative draw.
Earlier issues dealt with what a response says about a finding. This one is about what it claims not to need to look at.
The observation is small and entirely ordinary. Microbial plates — sterility, environmental monitoring, water samples — sat in the incubators without the records that connect a result to a batch. FDA is specific: the firm “did not have raw data and information related to sample preparation and the batch/sample identification number available for review,” and “did not document the associated data and information contemporaneously.”
A second thread runs alongside it. Critical CGMP forms used to record test results — the sterility test report among them — were printed from the firm’s IQVIA software and were not adequately controlled.
The rest of the letter establishes why that matters here rather than somewhere less consequential. Smoke studies showed air bouncing off an operator’s chest and re-entering the filling line; gram-negative organisms appeared repeatedly in ISO 5 air samples; the filling rooms held lower pressure than the rooms next to them.
Set against a five-year history of sterility and media-fill failures, a sterility record is not a paperwork question. It is the only evidence the batch has.
The response reads as a model of self-disclosure, and deserves to be described that way. The firm went back through its in-process microbiological worksheets, found the problem was larger than investigators had seen — fourteen further batches — invalidated the tests for all sixteen, then proposed independent review of everything else.
“You also commit to engaging an independent third-party consultant to review the integrity of data by conducting a complete review of all batch release records and a sample of other CGMP records using statistical methods.” FDA’s summary of the firm’s 483 response, Warning Letter 320-26-80
Read that as a quality professional and it is a defensible plan: complete coverage where risk concentrates, valid sampling everywhere else. FDA rejected it.
“Your response is limited to discarding sterility tests you conducted during our inspection and that were found to have inadequate CGMP documentation.” The further fourteen came from searching the same worksheets for the same gap. Nothing asked when uncontrolled printing of test forms began, or which other microbiological activities were documented that way.
Sixteen results were withdrawn. The batches they released still exist, their sterility now unestablished rather than unfavourable, and the response does not say what follows for product in distribution. FDA’s phrasing points past the documents: the full scope of the impact on microbiological test reliability.
“You did not holistically assess microbiological laboratory practices to determine the full scope of the impact on microbiological test reliability. Additionally, your proposal for a third-party data integrity review using a statistical sampling method is inadequate, as the degree of retrospective review is not sufficient given the significance of the questionable practices documented during the inspection.” FDA, Warning Letter 320-26-80
Sampling works when you are characterising a population you believe behaves consistently. A retrospective review exists because that belief has been withdrawn. The operative clause is given the significance of the questionable practices: depth is set by the seriousness of the practice, not by what a sampling plan would consider sufficient.
The requested action asks for assessment of documentation systems used throughout manufacturing and laboratory operations — not a representative subset. Elsewhere in the letter, proposed CAPAs are rejected because they “lack sufficient detail and a description of how effectiveness of these actions will be evaluated.”
Sampling is the instinct the profession trains hardest, and it is correct almost everywhere. The exception is narrow: once a control failure has called a record-keeping practice into question, the population you would sample from is the thing in dispute. A percentage drawn from it inherits the doubt instead of resolving it.
The second half of this response is the more expensive habit. Discarding an unreliable result is correct and insufficient — the record goes away, the disposition it supported does not.
A defensible response would have started with the practice rather than the plates: when uncontrolled forms entered use, and which tests they touched. Full coverage of that population, whatever its size, then a lot-by-lot statement of what sixteen withdrawn results mean for product in commerce.
A sample tells you how often. After a documentation failure, FDA is asking how far.
Veritas Quality Consultants works with pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologics manufacturers on Form 483 responses, root cause analysis, and CAPA development — built to FDA expectations inside the 15-day window.
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